Alliance Manchester Business School, The University of Manchester, UK Within the existing leadership literature, the role of context for shaping the effectiveness of leadership is yet to be fully understood. One type of context that poses particular challenges for leaders is an environment where safety is highly critical (i.e., high exposure to risk and likelihood of an accident). We hypothesize that such environments call for specific transformational and transactional leadership behaviours, which differ from those behaviours most effective in less safety-critical contexts. We tested for moderating effects of perceptions of hazard exposure and accident likelihood on the relationship between transformational leadership and Management-By-Exception-Active with safety and job performance outcomes. The moderation effects of accident likelihood on the link between transformational/MBEA leadership and subordinate performance were supported, demonstrating variation in the effectiveness of leader behaviours dependent on followers' perceptions about the likelihood for an accident. MBEA leadership was found to be more strongly linked to contextual performance and safety participation if accident likelihood was high, but not under low accident likelihood conditions. Transformational leadership was found to be less strongly related to these performance outcomes in contexts where safety was perceived as highly critical. Our findings have important theoretical and practical implications, and call into question the universality of the transformational-transactional leadership framework. Practical considerations focus on the implications for managers and supervisors who operate in safety-critical contexts.
The transformational-transactional leadership framework (Bass, 1985) continues to dominate the leadership literature and studies have linked transformational leadership to a range of outcome variables, including workplace safety (e.g., Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002; Clarke, 2013; Mullen & Kelloway, 2009; O'Dea & Flin, 2001 ). However, criticism has been growing that current leadership thinking needs to consider further the context in which the leadership process takes place (Antonakis, Avolio, & Sivasubramaniam, 2003; Liden & Antonakis, 2009; Rowold, 2011; Schriesheim, Wu, & Scandura, 2009) . Leadership styles that are valued and effective in one work context might be less desired and less effective in another context (Antonakis et al., 2003) . Concerns have been raised that an approach that advocates a universal way to lead oversimplifies the leadership process (Rowold, 2011) . Whilst we recognize that stable personality characteristics (Bono & Judge, 2004; Lim & Ployhart, 2004 ) and development of a personal style of leading (Johnson, Venus, Lanaj, Mao, & Chang, 2012) will bring a degree of consistency, there is evidence to suggest that leadership behaviours are adapted to the context (Denison, Hooijberg, & Quinn, 1995; Hannah, Balthazard, Waldman, Jennings, & Thatcher, 2013; Vroom & Jago, 2007) and that followers' expectations about leadership vary in dependence of the context (Lord & Emrich, 2001; Smothers, Bing, White, Trocchia, & Absher, 2011) .
The present study contributes to the occupational safety leadership literature by investigating whether the degree to which safety is perceived as critical within a work environment impacts on the effectiveness of transformational leadership (TFL) and Management-By-Exception-Active (MBEA) as a dimension of transactional leadership. TFL is concerned with inspiring followers, providing a positive vision and challenging existing standards, and a leader practicing MBEA vigilantly monitors performance and corrects irregularities as soon as these occur (Bass, 1985; Bass & Riggio, 2006) . The present study also makes contributions to the wider leadership literature by examining leadership in a prevention-focused setting, by exploring contextual boundaries of transformationaltransactional leadership, and by combining behavioural and contingency approaches to leadership.
Contexts where safety is highly critical, such as oil and gas installations, mining or construction sites, are inherently hazardous and errors, deviations from standards, and other failures can have severe consequences. In addition, safety-critical contexts have been described as ambiguous, given that safety often competes with other goals, such as cost (Zohar, 2010 ). Yet, our understanding of leadership in contexts where the risk for accidents is pervasive and employees face dangerous hazards, is less developed than that of leadership in more common workplace contexts where safety is not a strong concern (Baran & Scott, 2010) . Unstable, high-risk situations engender particular expectations about leadership (Lord & Emrich, 2001 ) and require emphasis on particular actions in the leadership process (Baran & Scott, 2010) . Results by Antonakis et al. (2003) , for example, indicate that the relationships between dimensions of the transformational-transactional leadership model vary when comparing samples from higher and lower risk environments. Thus, contexts where safety is highly critical might trigger different expectations about leadership amongst followers and/or can bring about an adjustment in leaders' behaviour. We propose that in safety-critical conditions, leader practices such as correcting errors and active monitoring of safety behaviour (MBEA) will be more strongly associated with performance whilst inspirational leader behaviours (TFL) will be less strongly related to performance. We use the term safety-critical to refer to employees' perceptions of the level of exposure to hazards and the degree of likelihood for experiencing an accident in their work environment. Accident likelihood refers to more subjective perceptions about the risk to be involved in an accident, and the possibility to be injured at work. Hazard exposure relates to perceptions about the physical presence of hazards in one's work environment. By choosing these two characteristics, the level of hazards present within a work environment as well as the degree of risk for an accident stemming from these, which can differ depending on how hazards are handled, are represented.
We empirically test the proposition that perceptions of accident likelihood and hazard exposure will moderate the effectiveness of TFL and MBEA using leaders' ratings of subordinate job performance (i.e., task performance and contextual performance) and safety performance (i.e., safety compliance and safety participation). Figure 1 illustrates a summary of the study's hypotheses and the conceptual integration of contingency and behavioural leadership perspective.
Theory integration: Merging contingency and behavioural leadership conceptualizations DeRue, Nahrgang, Wellman, and Humphrey (2011) warn that proliferation of leadership theories has hampered research in developing an understanding of leadership that matches the complexities of reality where different approaches to leadership, such as contingency, and behavioural elements, take effect concurrently.
We borrow tenets from substitutes for leadership theory (Kerr & Jermier, 1978) and integrate these with the transformational-transactional leadership framework. Kerr and Jermier (1978; Howell, Dorfman, & Kerr, 1986) suggested that certain conditions diminish or amplify the effect of leadership behaviours. It was suggested that empirical evidence for traditional contingency theories (e.g., Fiedler, 1964; Kerr & Jermier, 1978) failed to flourish because the theories' propositions were too rigid, disorganized, and centred on contingency factors that were too abstract and lacking in real-world value (Arvonen & Ekvall, 1999; Villa, Howell, Dorfman, & Daniel, 2003) . In addition, whilst traditional contingency frameworks identify context factors, the leader behaviour categories of substitutes for leadership theory have been criticized as too crude and incomprehensive (Yukl, 2010) . To overcome some of the above shortcomings of traditional contingency theories, we examine perceptions of hazard exposure and accident likelihood as contingency factors that have applied value and test these as moderators of transformational-transactional leadership as a framework with established behavioural dimensions.
Leadership in safety-critical contexts
There is considerable evidence that leaders play a pivotal role in shaping workplace safety and can influence employee safety behaviours and safety attitudes (Barling et al., 2002 Clarke, 2010 , 2013 Mullen & Kelloway, 2009; Zohar, 2002) , which in turn relate to bottom-line safety criteria such as accident and incident rates (Clarke, 2013; Kelloway, Mullen, & Francis, 2006; Zohar, 2002) . However, the type of leadership behaviours that are effective in contexts where safety is perceived as critical might differ from leadership practices that are effective if perceptions of risk and hazards are lower.
Work context refers to the 'backdrop' that entails a variety of moderating factors that impact on job role requirements and work behaviours (Dierdorff, Rubin, & Morgeson, 2009 ). Johns (2006, p. 386 ) defines context as 'situational opportunities and constraints that affect the occurrence and meaning of organizational behaviour as well as functional relationships between variables'. It has been shown that contextual factors can influence cognitive tendencies such as regulatory focus orientation (Kark & Van Dijk, 2007) . Regulatory focus theory (Crowe & Higgins, 1997) postulates that actions are guided by a prevention focus, which is oriented towards avoidance of loss, or a promotion focus, which regulates behaviour towards gain and accretion. Leaders' behaviour is influenced through their inherent regulatory focus and their situational regulatory focus, with the former being relatively stable, but the latter being altered by contextual cues (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Kark & Van Dijk, 2007) . Thus, even if a leader's inherent regulatory focus is more promotion-oriented, contextual factors can elicit this to shift towards a preventionoriented focus.
The heightened importance of reliability and avoidance of failure in highly safetycritical contexts might act as a trigger to activate a more prevention focus compared to less safety-critical contexts. In support of this argument, Wallace, Johnson, and Frazier (2009) have linked a prevention regulatory focus to increased safety performance. In contexts where errors do not have the potential for catastrophic outcomes, the focus might be more persistently on promoting gain and a prevention focus might be less activated (Rodriguez & Griffin, 2009 ). Moreover, Wallace et al.'s (2009) results showed that in a model where workplace-situational regulatory focus and inherent regulatory focus were entered simultaneously, only workplace-situational focus was significantly related to safety performance. This indicates that regulatory focus orientations that were prompted through contextual factors such as work surroundings are most relevant in predicting behaviour .
Transformational leadership has been associated with a promotion focus and transactional leadership with a prevention focus (Kark & Van Dijk, 2007) . If promotion and prevention regulatory focus are differently balanced depending on how critical safety is perceived within a work context, then this implies that the effectiveness of transformational and transactional leadership will vary accordingly. Based on the foregoing conceptualization that work context influences regulatory focus, our research investigates whether the level to which safety is perceived as critical is a context factor that impacts on the relationship between leadership style and employee safety and job performance.
Call for context: Transactional leadership in safety-critical contexts Transactional leadership has received considerably less attention from researchers than transformational, with studies that have examined the effectiveness of transactional leadership producing mixed evidence. In a meta-analytic review, Judge and Piccolo (2004) note that positive, neutral, and negative relationships between transactional leadership and leader effectiveness criteria have been reported. They suggest that these inconsistencies on the effectiveness of transactional leadership could be explained by context differences. For example, Antonakis et al. (2003) argued that MBEA is unnecessarily controlling in some contexts, whilst in other contexts such practices are beneficial for performance (Antonakis et al., 2003) . If a prevention-oriented focus is activated in contexts where safety is perceived as highly critical, then leadership practices related to MBEA might be more relevant given that MBEA has been associated with a prevention-oriented focus (Antonakis et al., 2003; Rodriguez & Griffin, 2009 ). In line with this, research has demonstrated that fit between followers' prevalent regulatory focus and leadership style leads to beneficial outcomes (Hamstra, Van Yperen, Wisse, & Sassenberg, 2014) .
In Bass (1985) original framework, transactional leadership consisted of MBEA (i.e., monitoring for problems as they arise and correcting these proactively) as well as Management-By-Exception-Passive (i.e., not taking action until issues occur, waiting for things to go wrong before interfering) and Contingent Reward (clarifying what followers can expect in exchange for their efforts and rewarding achievements). However, examinations of the structure of transactional leadership have repeatedly identified MBEA as a single factor, with Contingent Reward representing a dimension of transformational leadership and Management-By-Exception-Passive representing a passive leadership factor together with laissez-faire leadership (Den Hartog, Van Muijen, & Koopman, 1997; Hinkin & Schriesheim, 2008) . Hence, there is evidence that MBEA is the only dimension of transactional leadership and we therefore focus on MBEA. We do not include passive leadership in our study as empirical evidence has consistently shown that passive leadership is negatively related to job performance and workplace safety outcomes (Judge & Piccolo, 2004; Kelloway et al., 2006) . The purpose of our study was to examine whether different active leadership styles are more or less effective in dependence of the extent to which safety is perceived as critical within a work context.
Cognitive assumptions about leadership are dynamic with contextual attributes influencing leaders' and followers' schemas of effective leadership (Shondrick & Lord, 2010) . Implicit leadership theories postulate that a change in context can shift followers' as well as leaders' implicit expectations about aspects of leadership (Derler & Weibler, 2014; Lord & Emrich, 2001; Smothers et al., 2011) . As a consequence, leaders might adjust their behaviour and followers can become more or less receptive towards certain leadership practices (Lord, Hannah, & Jennings, 2011) . Therefore, in safety-critical contexts, the effectiveness of MBEA might be enhanced because (1) leaders perceive MBEA behaviours as more apt and adjust their use of MBEA accordingly, and/or (2) followers increase their receptiveness towards MBEA. Thus, high hazard and high accident risk conditions may activate a prevention focus and in conjunction sway leaders' and/or followers' implicit expectations of MBEA, leading to a stronger positive relationship with safety and job performance.
There is evidence from leadership research in crisis and disaster contexts, which share characteristics with safety-critical contexts, that leadership styles akin to MBEA have increased relevance under such conditions. For example, DeChurch et al. (2011) discussed the importance for leaders to structure work and to provide coordination in disaster conditions. Others have discussed facilitation of sensemaking (Baran & Scott, 2010; Mumford, Friedrich, Caughron, & Byrne, 2007) and pragmatic leadership (Yammarino, Mumford, Connelly, & Dionne, 2010) as key for effective leadership in dangerous contexts. MBEA behaviours such as clarifying responsibilities are likely to aid sensemaking, and by monitoring task execution for problems, leaders can be pragmatic and put solutions into place. Drawing on this body of research in dangerous contexts, it can be asserted that MBEA becomes relevant for effective leadership if safety is perceived as highly critical, as it addresses issues of sensemaking and pragmatic problem-solving.
Consistent with this proposition, Clarke (2013) in her meta-analysis showed that active transactional leadership was positively related to safety compliance (q = .41) and safety participation (q = .36). Griffin and Talati (2011) showed in their meta-analysis that the mean level of MBEA within a sample moderated the correlation between MBEA and employees' extra effort and satisfaction with leadership. The authors explained that high mean levels are a proximal indicator for MBEA practices being favourably perceived within the work context, and therefore have a stronger impact on leadership outcomes (Griffin & Talati, 2011) . This is in line with our proposition that the effectiveness of MBEA varies across different work settings. Yet, the understanding of the influence of specific context factors on relationships between variables is little developed (Johns, 2006) . Thus, we further advance Griffin and Talati's (2011) work by investigating exposure to hazards and likelihood for an accident as concrete contextual factors that may impact on the relationship between MBEA and performance outcomes.
Whilst we argue that MBEA plays a particularly important role if safety is perceived as highly critical, it can be suggested that these leadership tactics have no effect or might even be detrimental for performance if safety is perceived as less critical as the need for continuous correction of errors is reduced (Antonakis et al., 2003) . As argued above, context can alter followers' and leaders' evaluations of what constitutes effective leadership (Emrich, 1999; Lord et al., 2011) . Just as fit between leadership style and followers' prominent regulatory focus fosters a positive impact by leaders, mismatch between leadership behaviour and followers' prevention-promotion focus prohibits such desirable effects (Hamstra et al., 2014) . Therefore, if employees perceive lower hazard levels and assess little threat for an accident, a consequently more promotionoriented regulatory focus could clash with MBEA leader behaviours, so that these might be less positively related to safety and job performance.
We expect that followers' perceptions of hazard exposure and accident likelihood will moderate the relationship between MBEA with both safety performance and job performance, as both performance types take place under the same contextual constraints. Dierdorff et al. (2009) explain that role enactment (e.g., of a managerial role or team member role) is shaped by contextual factors, so that the role in its entirety interplays with the context in which it is performed. In their roles, employees commonly perform safety-specific aspects at the same time and intertwined with general performance elements (e.g., performing a general job task whilst wearing protective equipment correctly), so that a regulatory focus or implicit expectations about leadership are less likely to be determined by the specific performance element, but the overall context in which job performance and safety performance takes place. We therefore expect perceptions of hazard exposure and accident likelihood to have the same moderation effects for job performance as well as safety performance.
Job performance and safety performance are multidimensional outcomes, and in our study, we investigate the individual dimensions, that is, task performance, contextual performance, safety participation, and safety compliance separately. Most taxonomies of work performance incorporate a distinction between formal, withinrole behaviours (task performance) and extra-role, discretionary behaviours (contextual performance; e.g., Borman & Motowidlo, 1997) . Based on this widely accepted partitioning of work performance, Griffin and Neal (2000) developed an analogy of safety performance. They proposed safety compliance with rules and regulations as a correspondent to task performance, and safety participation, which describes extrarole behaviours for safety, as a correspondent to contextual performance. Transactional leadership has been more strongly related to task performance and safety compliance, and transformational leadership more strongly related to contextual performance and safety participation (e.g., Clarke, 2013) . Accordingly, including overall measures of job and safety performance could obscure differences in the strength of relationship between the two leadership styles with these outcome dimensions. Therefore, we investigate individual performance dimensions (i.e., safety compliance/participation and task/contextual performance), and propose separate hypotheses for each of the performance outcomes ( Figure 1 ):
Perceived accident likelihood moderates the relationship of MBEA to safety compliance (hypothesis 1a), safety participation (hypothesis 1b), task performance (hypothesis 1c), and contextual performance (hypothesis 1d). It is expected that MBEA will be more positively related to safety performance and job performance outcomes if perceived accident likelihood is high.
Hypothesis 2(a, b, c, d): Perceived hazard exposure moderates the relationship of MBEA to safety compliance (hypothesis 2a), safety participation (hypothesis 2b), task performance (hypothesis 2c), and contextual performance (hypothesis 2d). It is expected that MBEA will be more positively related to safety performance and job performance outcomes if perceived hazard exposure is high.
Call for context: Transformational leadership in safety-critical contexts
The lack of consideration of contextual factors does not just apply to transactional leadership practices, but also to investigations of TFL (Liden & Antonakis, 2009; Rowold, 2011) . Empirical studies have demonstrated that TFL practices are related to workplace safety and have associated TFL with outcomes such as employee safety behaviour (e.g., Barling et al., 2002) and safety incident rates (e.g., Kelloway et al., 2006) . However, there is little research aimed at understanding the degree of effectiveness of TFL practices under different contextual conditions (Rowold, 2011) . Such research is essential to be able to offer precise guidance to leaders who are operating in safety-critical contexts. We propose that TFL is less strongly related to performance in contexts where safety is perceived as highly critical compared to contexts where safety is perceived as less critical.
As argued above, safety-critical contexts activate a prevention-oriented focus and trigger expectations about leadership that focus on creating structure and problemsolving (Antonakis et al., 2003; Rodriguez & Griffin, 2009; Wallace et al., 2009) . TFL, which is associated with a promotion focus (Kark & Van Dijk, 2007) , therefore would mismatch the dominant regulatory focus and not be consistent with contextinduced expectations of leadership. Consequently, it can be expected that leaders will be less reliant on TFL in safety-critical contexts and/or followers could be less responsive towards TFL practices. In line with this, D oci and Hofmans (2015) showed that leaders engage less frequently in TFL if task complexity is high, explaining that in such circumstances, 'there is no space for stimulating, inspiring behaviors, or soliciting followers' ideas but it is more beneficial to give clear directions ' (p. 9) . Similarly, followers who perceive their work context as hazardous and evaluate the risk for an accident as high might have less capacity to respond to any TFL behaviours that their leader adopts, so that these are less influential on follower performance. Research has indicated that threats of danger can increase complexity in a work environment, which could then lead to increased cognitive demands (Baran & Scott, 2010; Hannah, Uhl-Bien, Avolio, & Cavarretta, 2009 ). Furthermore, there has been discussion whether TFL practices, such as intellectual stimulation, provide employees with greater latitude in how they interpret and implement safety rules and regulations, which could add to existing ambiguity and be detrimental for performance if safety is highly critical (Clarke, 2013; Inness, Turner, Barling, & Stride, 2010) .
As noted above, there is evidence that TFL is more strongly related to extra-role behaviours (i.e., contextual performance, safety participation) than in-role performance (i.e., task performance, safety compliance). We therefore expect that the direction of the relationship between TFL with within-role and extra-role performance criteria is in the same direction, but that the interaction effect between TFL with accident likelihood and hazard exposure is more pronounced for contextual performance/safety participation than for task performance/safety compliance. To be able to examine whether the moderation effect differs in strength for within-role and extra-role outcomes, we present separate hypotheses for each of the performance outcome dimensions. Based on the above argument that TFL is less relevant if hazards and risk are perceived as high, we propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3(a, b, c, d): Perceived accident likelihood moderates the relationship of TFL to safety compliance (hypothesis 3a), safety participation (hypothesis 3b), task performance (hypothesis 3c), and contextual performance (hypothesis 3d). It is expected that TFL will be less positively related to safety performance and job performance outcomes if perceived accident likelihood is high.
Hypothesis 4(a, b, c, d): Perceived hazard exposure moderates the relationship of TFL to safety compliance (hypothesis 4a), safety participation (hypothesis 4b), task performance (hypothesis 4c), and contextual performance (hypothesis 4d). It is expected that TFL will be less positively related to safety performance and job performance outcomes if perceived hazard exposure is high.
Method
We conducted a two-source study with responses from both leaders and team members to test our hypotheses. Responses had a team-based structure as members from the same team rated their communal leader. Thus, we investigated whether hazard exposure and accident likelihood represent team-level perceptions. Members of the same team are exposed to similar contextual characteristics as they work in the same environment. Safety performance behaviours are important outcomes in occupational safety as these have been demonstrated to predict error making and accident involvement (Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009; Clarke, 2010 Clarke, , 2013 . Leadership was investigated as an individual-level variable, as we did not want to assess a leaders' general approach, but the effect of specific leadership behaviours as experienced by individual team members. It is well acknowledged within leader-member exchange theory, for example, that leaders vary in their behaviour with different team members (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995) , which could not be captured by aggregating leadership to the team level. Focusing on individuallevel leadership also matches our examination of safety performance and job performance as individual-level outcomes.
Procedure and participants
We distributed questionnaires to employees of two organizations, an oil and gas service company and a food manufacturing company. We selected these two sectors to compile a sample of participants, who all work in contexts where safety plays a role, but with variation in the levels of hazard exposure and likelihood for an accident. In the oil and gas service company, the employees who were invited to participate worked on offshore rigs. Offshore installations pose major hazards such as handling explosive materials, pressurization control, and risk for hydrocarbon release. In addition, participants' work activities pose risks from handling and lifting activities (e.g., operating pulley systems), being struck by objects, and working at heights. The participants from the food manufacturing company were based in a factory setting, with the majority of participants working in the production process. Common risks associated with this work setting are colliding with machinery, handling hot goods and chemicals as well as slips, trips, and falls. A total of 239 team members and their team leaders from twenty-four teams were invited to take part. In the oil and gas company, for one team none of the team members choose to participate in the study and for two further teams only one team member participated, respectively. It was therefore decided to omit these cases prior to the analysis. Outlier analysis led to deletion of four cases. The final sample included in the analysis consisted of 160 team members from twenty-one teams (oil and gas company: 69 team members from ten teams; manufacturing company: 91 team members from eleven teams). The mean age amongst team members was 36.35 years, SD = 11.59. A total of 119 team members were male and twenty-seven female and fourteen team members did not indicate their gender. Team leaders provided ratings on their team members' safety and job performance (M age = 38.38, SD = 8.65; seventeen team leaders were male). Team sizes ranged from 4 to 17 members with a mean size of 10.76 members (SD = 3.5; oil and gas M team size = 11, SD = 3.62, manufacturing M team size = 10.54, SD = 3.56). On average, teams had 7.62 team members who were included in the analysis (SD = 2.67; oil and gas services company M = 6.9, SD = 2.42, manufacturing company M = 8.27, SD = 2.82). The average percentage of members per team who were included in the analysis was 71.66% (oil and gas average rate per team 63.88%, ranging from 40% to 83.3%; manufacturing average rate per team 79.44%, ranging from 64.29% to 100%).
Measures
Transformational leadership and MBEA Team members rated their team leader's leadership style on the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ version 5x-Short, Avolio & Bass, 1995) . CFA showed acceptable fit for a factor structure with MBEA as a single factor and TFL consisting of its subdimensions of Idealized Influence, Individual Consideration, Inspirational Motivation, and Intellectual Stimulation, v 2 (342) = 486.10, CFI = .93, TLI = .92, RMSEA = .05. This factor structure showed better fit compared to a model where Contingent Reward loaded together with MBEA on a transactional leadership factor, v 2 (342) = 498.22, CFI = .92, TLI = .91, RMSEA = .05. The results from CFA are in line with other research on the MLQ dimensionality (Den Hartog et al., 1997; Hinkin & Schriesheim, 2008) . The transformational leadership scale (a = .90) and MBEA scale (a = .76) showed good internal consistency.
Accident likelihood
Team members reported their accident likelihood perceptions on two items, adapted from Cox and Cheyne (2000) , 'I am sure it is only a matter of time before I am involved in an accident' and 'In my job the chances of being involved in an accident are quite large'. The response scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The original scale included a third item ('I am rarely worried about being injured on the job'). However, CFA showed that this item had a non-significant loading onto the common factor (À.01). The problematic item was reverse worded and it has been shown that reversed items can have lower item-scale correlations, resulting in poorer psychometric properties for the measure (e.g., Barnette, 2000; Schriesheim & Eisenbach, 1995; Spector, Van Katwyk, Brannick, & Chen, 1997) . Moreover, the item's content focuses on injuries whilst the other two items are concerned with accidents which could have also contributed to its lack of coherence with the other two items. Thus, it was decided to exclude this third item in the analysis. The remaining two items both showed significant factor loadings of .59 and .76. Cronbach's alpha for the two-item scale was .56, which although below the commonly accepted value of .70 is acceptable given the small number of items (Eisinga, Grotenhuis, & Pelzer, 2013) .
Hazard exposure
Team members rated the level of hazard exposure in their job on one item from DeJoy, Schaffer, Wilson, Vandenberg, and Butts (2004) : 'Rate your current work environment in terms of your exposure to safety hazards'. The response scale ranged from 1 = very high hazard level (very unsafe) to 5 = very low hazard level (very safe). We reverse-coded hazard exposure scores prior to the analysis, so that high values represent higher levels of hazard exposure. DeJoy et al. (2004) demonstrated that this single-item measure is significantly linked to related constructs such as environmental safety conditions. It has been demonstrated that if a construct is concrete or uniform, single-item measurement is acceptable and performs comparably to multiple-item scales (Nagy, 2002; Wanous, Reichers, & Hudy, 1997) . Similar single-item scales have been successfully used in previous safety research (e.g., Dedobbeleer & B eland, 1991; Morrow & Crum, 1998) . We conducted a CFA to test whether the two accident likelihood items and single hazard exposure item could be combined into an overall factor representing how safety-critical a context is overall. The hazard exposure item did not load significantly onto the common factor (À.07) and only the two accident likelihood items showed significant factor loadings. Therefore, accident likelihood and hazard exposure were tested as separate moderator variables in the subsequent analysis.
Safety compliance and safety participation
Team leaders rated each of their team members' safety performance on six items by Griffin and Neal (2000) . Three items addressed compliance with safety rules and procedures (safety compliance) and three items addressed extra effort for safety (safety participation). An example item is 'This person uses all the necessary safety equipment to do his/her job' with a response scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Both measures had good internal consistency (safety compliance a = .86 and safety participation a = .93).
Task performance and contextual performance
Team leaders rated their team members' job performance on six items. In line with Borman and Motowidlo's (1997) model of different performance behaviours, we assessed task performance (the extent to which an employee meets in-role expectations) and contextual performance (the extent to which an employee goes beyond prescribed responsibilities) as separate dimensions of overall work performance. Three items by Griffin, Neal, and Parker (2007) addressed task performance and three items addressed contextual performance. These were modified from Griffin and Neal's (2000) safety performance scale to represent non-domain-specific extra effort. An example item is 'This person makes suggestions to improve the overall effectiveness of the company' with a response scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Both measures had good internal consistency (task performance a = .87 and contextual performance a = .90).
We conducted a CFA for the four performance outcomes (i.e., safety compliance, safety participation, task performance, and contextual performance). All item loadings were significant and the model showed good fit (CFI = .97, TLI = .95, RMSEA = .08).
As we obtained several variables from the same source (i.e., team members rated leadership style and perception of hazard exposure and accident likelihood; leaders rated safety compliance, safety participation, task performance, contextual performance), it is important to establish discriminant validity for latent variables of the same source. For this, we followed Fornell and Larcker (1981) by calculating the square root of the average variance explained (AVE) for each construct. Table 2 shows that the square root of the AVE for each construct exceeds the correlation between the construct and any other construct that was rated by the same source, indicating that variables obtained from the same source have adequate discriminant validity.
Multilevel analysis
The data had a nested structure as participants were clustered within teams. Failing to address dependency amongst observations is likely to underestimate the standard errors of model parameters and increase the risk for a type I error (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) . Table 1 shows intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC 1 and ICC 2 ) and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) for differences in variable means across the twenty-one teams. We expected perceptions of accident likelihood and hazard exposure to be team-level variables as these are contextual attributes that are shared across all members of a team. For hazard exposure, the ICC 1 and ICC 2 value and ANOVA supported aggregation to the team level. However, for accident likelihood, the ICC 1 and ICC 2 values were low and ANOVA was non-significant. Small ICC values indicate that most of the variation is within teams rather than between teams and hence do not support aggregation to team level (Bliese, 2000) . Thus, accident likelihood was not aggregated and assessed as an individual-level moderator in the analysis. One's perceptions of risk are not only constructed by objective facts within the physical context but also determined through subjective components (Hansson, 2010) , which could explain why there is variation in perceptions of accident likelihood amongst members of the same team. For example, an individual's assessment of risk is impacted by their judgement of their own ability to handle potential hazards, which can be over-or underestimated depending on individual factors (Deery, 2000; Ulleberg & Rundmo, 2003) . Thus, perceptions of accident likelihood are not independent from individual characteristics and subjective experiences (Deery, 2000; Ulleberg & Rundmo, 2003) , which can explain why accident likelihood perceptions did not converge at the team level.
Whilst there is no hard rule for a minimum proportion of between-group variance to indicate non-independence, it has been stressed that even low ICC 1 values of .05 can lead to bias (Aguinis, Gottfredson, & Culpepper, 2013) . Values for the remaining study variables suggested that between-group variance should be controlled to avoid bias of the analysis. Thus, when testing individual-level relationships, between-group variance was accounted for by modelling variables on the within and between level using Mplus software (Muth en & Muth en, 2010). To test the cross-level moderation effect of team hazard exposure on the relationship of MBEA and TFL on safety and job performance at the individual level, we specified a random slope model as described below. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for the study variables. As expected, participants who worked in the oil and gas service company reported higher levels of accident likelihood and more exposure to hazards compared to the food manufacturing subsample (for accident likelihood: M oil and gas = 3.06; M manufacturing = 2.56; t = 3.56, p < .001; for team-level hazard exposure: M oil and gas = 3.90; M manufacturing = 3.24; t = 12.12, p < .001). A series of multilevel path models were specified to test whether accident likelihood and team-level hazard exposure moderate the relationships of TFL and MBEA to safety compliance, safety participation, task performance, and contextual performance. At the team level, we controlled for subsample membership. To avoid model non-convergence, interactions were tested in separate models for the outcome variables (Table 3 for safety compliance and safety participation, Table 4 for task performance and contextual performance). We used the Mplus TYPE = TWO LEVEL RANDOM command with Maximum Likelihood Robust (MLR) estimation (Muth en & Muth en, 2010) . To test the cross-level interaction between team-level hazard exposure and individual-level leadership style (i.e., TFL and MBEA), we followed guidelines by Aguinis et al. (2013) and Preacher, Zyphur, and Zhang (2010) . Hazard exposure at level 2 was tested as a moderator of the relationship between TFL and MBEA with performance outcome variables at level 1. Random slopes were specified for the within-level component of the respective leadership variables and outcome variables, and team-level hazard exposure was regressed on the random slopes. For accident likelihood, we specified the interaction between accident likelihood and leadership at level 1, and included the same relationships between leadership and performance outcomes as level 2. Log-likelihood-based chi-square difference test with scaling correction factors was used to test whether adding the cross-level interaction term improved model fit (Muth en & Muth en, 2010) . In partial support of hypothesis 1, accident likelihood moderated the relationship between MBEA and safety participation (1b) and contextual performance (1d). We used Preacher, Curran, and Bauer's (2006) computational tool for plotting interaction effects in multilevel models. We drew interaction plots for safety participation (Figure 2 ) and contextual performance (Figure 3) to depict the moderation effect of accident likelihood Notes. MBEA = Management-By-Exception-Active. Values along the diagonal in italic are square root of AVE. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Results
at one standard deviation above and below the mean and at the mean value. 1 In line with our hypothesis, the direction of the moderation effect indicates that engaging in MBEA leadership may have a positive effect on subordinates' performance if the risk for an accident is perceived as high. However, if the risk for an accident is perceived as low, adopting MBEA leadership practices could actually be detrimental for employees' safety participation and contextual performance. Moreover, in support of hypothesis 3d, accident likelihood also moderated the relationship between TFL and contextual performance. The direction of this moderation effect was in line with our hypothesis, showing that TFL was positively associated with contextual performance if accident likelihood was low, but that the relationship was negative if accident likelihood was high (Figure 4) .
Hypotheses 2 and 4 were not supported, as team-level hazard exposure did not moderate any of the relationships between MBEA and TFL with any of the job and safety performance outcomes. In addition, there were no significant main effects of either MBEA or TFL on safety and job performance.
Discussion
We explored whether perceptions of accident likelihood and hazard exposure impact on the effectiveness of MBEA and TFL for safety and job performance outcomes. In partial Dawson (2014) discusses that values above/below one standard deviation are relatively arbitrary examples of high and low levels of the moderator variable. We depicted the moderation effect at these commonly used values as perceptions of accident likelihood slide along a continuum without a definitive value that represents attested levels of high or low perceptions of accident likelihood. However, the plots should be interpreted with Dawson's (2014) notion in mind, illustrating the direction of the effect rather than the relationships at levels of the moderator that do not necessarily reflect a relevant threshold.
support of our hypotheses, individual-level perceptions of accident likelihood moderated the relationship between MBEA and safety participation and contextual performance. If employees perceived the risk to be involved in an accident as high, MBEA was positively related to safety participation and contextual performance, but showed a negative relationship if accident likelihood was rated as low. These findings suggest that the effectiveness of MBEA is not entirely independent from individuals' perceptions of context. However, no evidence was found for hazard exposure as a higher-level context factor as moderator. Our finding on the moderating role of accident likelihood perceptions is in line with research on crisis in work environments. It has been argued that under crisis conditions, employees are more receptive to directive forms of leadership (D oci & Hofmans, 2015; Morgeson, 2005) which potentially is due to enhanced complexity within the situation (D oci & Hofmans, 2015; Mumford et al., 2007) . Drawing on complexity leadership theory (Uhl-Bien, Marion, & McKelvey, 2007) , Baran and Scott (2010) suggest that reducing ambiguity and sensemaking through behaviours such as direction setting and situational awareness is core to effective leadership under extreme conditions. Our results indicate that if the likelihood for an accident is perceived as high, instructive leader tactics, which pre-empt error making and clarify the priority of safety, can have a positive influence on certain performance outcomes such as safety participation and contextual performance. Dahl and Olsen (2013) showed in a sample of offshore petroleum workers that leadership involvement (they did not test MBEA specifically) enhances safety compliance through increasing role clarity. However, if the risk for an accident is perceived as lower, then this level of vigilance and close leader intervention can be perceived as too controlling and therefore is associated with lower levels of performance (Antonakis et al., 2003; Griffin & Talati, 2011) . Whilst perceptions of high accident likelihood are likely to activate a prevention focus, lower accident likelihood can shift the focus towards a promotion focus which does not match up with MBEA behaviours. Such imparity between the activated regulatory focus and a leader's adopted style is detrimental and leads to reduced performance (Hamstra et al., 2014) . We did not find support for team-level hazard exposure as moderator of the relationship between leadership style and performance. Perceptions of risk for an actual accident might elicit an enhanced focus on prevention and need for structure, but the mere presence of hazards possibly does not engender such shift in focus to the same degree.
In the introduction, we proposed that an enhanced effect of MBEA on performance under safety-critical conditions could be due to leaders adjusting their leadership style, and/or due to followers being more attuned to MBEA. Although our study did not set out to formally test these two mechanisms, correlation results indicated that the moderation effect cannot be explained through leaders' behavioural adjustment and instead could be due to followers' being more receptive towards MBEA if the likelihood for an accident is perceived as high. Zero-order correlations showed that leaders' level of MBEA was negatively related to followers' perceptions of accident likelihood. Thus, if followers perceived the level of accident likelihood as high, leaders were actually rated lower on MBEA. This is in contrast to the proposition that leaders adjust their leadership style to include more MBEA if safety is highly critical and a prevention-oriented regulatory focus dominates. Instead, followers being more receptive towards their leaders' MBEA might explain the positive relationship between MBEA with safety participation and contextual performance. However, we did not assess followers' expectations of MBEA and future research should further examine the mechanisms that underlie the variation of effectiveness of MBEA in situations with different levels of accident likelihood.
Interestingly, accident likelihood only emerged as a moderator of the link between MBEA with extra-role performance measures (i.e., safety participation and contextual performance), but not for safety compliance and task performance as outcomes. Existing research has reported stronger links between transactional leadership and compliance than with extra-role performance; whereas transformational leadership has been more strongly linked to extra-role behaviours such as safety participation (Clarke, 2013; Griffin & Hu, 2013; Mullen & Kelloway, 2009) . The current results appear plausible given that the relationships were moderated by perceptions of the context. If team members perceive the threat for an accident within their work context as high, it is likely that they are intrinsically motivated to comply with safety rules and regulations regardless of their leader's behaviour. Thus, accident likelihood perceptions did not influence the link between MBEA and safety compliance. This interpretation is in line with the leadership substitute approach, which postulates that certain contextual factors can reduce the need for leadership (De Vries, Roe, & Taillieu, 2002; Kerr & Jermier, 1978) . However, MBEA practices such as vigilantly checking for mistakes and clarifying the priority of safety may encourage employees beyond their self-propelled efforts to comply with safety rules and to direct extra attention and resources to safety and their job objectives. Research has generally argued that transactional leadership is less effective for influencing extra-role behaviours (Clarke, 2013) . However, the present results showed that this conclusion may not hold under conditions where threat for an accident or harm is perceived as high. Thus, our findings further underpin the importance of considering perceptions of contextual characteristics when investigating the effectiveness of leadership.
The moderating effect of accident likelihood on the relationship between MBEA with safety participation and contextual performance could be explained through fit between leaders' behaviour and followers' situational regulatory focus. The direction of one's selfregulatory focus can be shaped through situational factors (Crowe & Higgins, 1997) . Perceiving a high threat for an accident is likely to orient followers' self-regulatory focus more towards prevention and the avoidance of losses (Rodriguez & Griffin, 2009) , and therefore make followers more sensitive towards their leaders' MBEA behaviour. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that variables other than situational factors, such as someone's inherent regulatory orientation, can also influence whether a promotion or prevention orientation dominates (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Kark & Van Dijk, 2007) . Moreover, it can be argued that followers to some extent create their work context through their own performance. As individuals interact with their context and the people within this context, they themselves effectuate contextual aspects such as risk and hazard levels. For example, the safety climate in an organization has been identified as a leading as well as lagging indicator of accidents (Payne, Bergman, Beus, Rodr ıguez, & Henning, 2009) . Thus, perceptions of safety-related contextual factors could, to some degree, be the outcome of employees' safety-related behaviour within the context. These alternative interpretations mean that leaders are not always able to adapt their style to a given context, as followers' perceptions of the context are determined by a range of factors including followers' inherent characteristics. The cross-sectional nature of our data prevents us from pinpointing the source of followers' context perceptions. Longitudinal research is needed to separate the direction of the relationships between leadership style, context perceptions, and follower safety and job performance.
Nevertheless, our results suggest that MBEA is not universally ineffective, but that its relationship with performance varies for different conditions. MBEA has often been discussed as a negative, controlling form of leadership (Griffin & Talati, 2011) . The present results challenge this unrefined, negative view and call for a more differentiated, condition-specific view of MBEA. Clarke (2013) provided meta-analytical evidence that active transactional leadership is positively linked with safety compliance and safety participation. In addition, literature on high-reliability organizations has emphasized the need for monitoring of procedural deviations as critical actions to control intrinsic hazards (Roberts, 1993) . Together with the present findings, this makes MBEA of interest to future research in the area of safety and highlights the importance of merging behavioural leadership approaches with contingency views.
As hypothesized, accident likelihood moderated the relationship between TFL and contextual performance. In support of our hypothesis, the direction of this effect showed that TFL is less effective for contextual performance if individuals perceive the risk for an accident as high. If accident likelihood is perceived as high, TFL might be mismatched with followers' intensified focus on prevention of loss and failure and is therefore less effective in influencing follower performance (Hamstra et al., 2014) . Cognitive demands could also play a role in our findings that TFL is less effective if accident likelihood is perceived as high. D oci and Hofmans (2015) explain that when a task becomes overly demanding, psychological resources are diminished which reduces a leader's ability to engage in TFL behaviours. Perceptions of high risk for an accident are likely to add complexity to a work situation (Baran & Scott, 2010) . In such conditions, not only the leader's but also followers' psychological resources are reduced and followers may be less receptive towards TFL behaviours. In an early study, Seltzer, Numerof, and Bass (1989) demonstrated that TFL under high stress conditions further exacerbates stress levels. Similarly, if perceptions of high risk for an accident make a situation more cognitively challenging, then TFL behaviours that ask followers to question the status quo or buy into a longer-term vision may only further mount demands and strain cognitive resources and therefore become counterproductive. Moreover, Inness et al. (2010) posit that TFL provide subordinates with greater latitude in how they implement safety rules and procedures. For example, intellectual stimulation could indirectly increase deviations from safety procedures as it encourages employees to try out new approaches to their work (Clarke, 2013) . TFL is associated with a promotion focus which in turn has been associated with greater risk taking (Friedman & F€ orster, 2001 ). This interpretation suggests that it might not be the context per se but the leaders' own behaviour that shapes follower regulatory focus and their context perceptions. Thus, our findings further add to this discussion that TFL may not be equally effective across all work contexts and future research is needed to investigate cognitive demands and regulatory focus as mechanisms of this effect.
Neither TFL nor MBEA had significant main effects with any of the performance outcomes. A strength of our study was the use of two-source data with supervisory performance ratings. The lack of support for a relationship between TFL and MBEA to safety and job performance calls into question whether the transformational-transactional leadership framework sufficiently captures leader practices that impact upon employee job and safety behaviours. Others have argued that research needs to look beyond the transformational-transactional framework for a more comprehensive, real-life understanding of effective leadership (Van Knippenberg & Sitkin, 2013) . Within the occupational safety literature, studies that have found support for a link between transformational leadership and safety outcomes have often used safety-specific operationalizations of leadership (e.g., Barling et al., 2002) . Kapp (2012) showed that nondomain-specific transformational leadership was only related to safety behaviour if it was coupled with a positive safety climate. Together with our findings, this criticism challenges researchers in the leadership field to not only pay attention to perceptions of contextual factors, but also to extend conceptualizations of leadership beyond the transformational-transactional leadership model.
The present research made an important, overarching contribution by integrating the contingency and behavioural perspectives on leadership. Although we only found support for perceptions of accident likelihood as moderator, the findings reinforce requests that the transformational-transactional leadership framework needs to be refined by integrating contingency views into its postulations (Avolio & Yammarino, 2013) .
Practical contributions
The research identified three moderation effects which lends some support that the perceptions of risk for an accident interact with leadership styles' effectiveness. These findings have important practical implications for managers and supervisors. The degree to which safety is perceived as critical within subordinates' work environments is often not a constant, but changes depending on the type of work task or project employees are currently performing. During some work periods, employees work in settings where safety is highly critical, and on other work days, perceptions of the risk for an accident are more moderate or low. For example, one of the host organizations was an oil and gas service provider where participants alternate between working on an offshore installation and working onshore at the company's base. Similarly, despite working in the same location, perceptions of context might vary between teams as different job groups interact differently with their work environment. Our results indicate that their supervisors should engage in MBEA when working offshore in situations when employees are likely to perceive the risk for an accident as higher, but that MBEA practices when working on tasks where perceived risk for accidents is lower could be detrimental for performance. This practical implication can be transferred to a range of other work settings where subordinates oscillate between conditions with differing degrees of risk for an accident. However, as discussed above it is likely that followers' perceptions of their context are influenced by variables other than the objective context itself (e.g., individual differences, leader's own behaviour), which were not assessed in the present study. Moreover, team-level hazard exposure did not interact with leadership style. Even if leaders have a repertoire of different behaviours, the key to using these effectively may be in attuning leaders to their followers' perceptions of the context and understanding what factors, including leaders themselves, shape how followers perceive context.
Limitations and future directions Whilst our study had some key strengths such as the use of two-source data to counter common source bias, the study exhibits several limitations. As noted above, one limitation is the cross-sectional study design, which restricts conclusions about the direction of causality for the links between leadership behaviours, perceptions of context, and employee performance. We investigated perceptions of accident likelihood and hazard exposure as moderators; however, these are also possible outcomes of leadership and follower behaviour. Both TFL and MBEA were negatively related to perceptions of accident likelihood, so that followers might perceive a higher risk for an accident because of their leaders' lack of active leadership. Due to the cross-sectional nature of our data and because we assessed perceptions of contextual aspects rather than a direct assessment of work context, we cannot make any firm conclusions whether perceptions of accident likelihood impact on the effectiveness of TFL and MBEA, or whether the level of TFL and MBEA determines followers' perceptions of accident likelihood. Future research should contrast perception of context to more objective measures of hazards and risk, such as safety audits or external risk assessments, to examine whether these overlap or interact differently with leader behaviour. Moreover, future research using a longitudinal design is needed to shed further light on the degree to which followers' perceptions of their context are influenced by external factors such as their leader's behaviour as well as their own safety behaviour and inherent characteristics (e.g., chronic regulatory focus).
Our sample size at the team level was modest and the number of cases within teams was small. Aguinis et al. (2013) discuss that multilevel research faces a particular dilemma of balancing out the chances for making a type I and type II error. We chose to employ multilevel modelling to take the nested data structures into account and avoid overestimating significance levels; however, small sample sizes at the higher unit reduce statistical power, increasing the risk for type II error (Aguinis et al., 2013) .This means that estimates are likely to be conservative and the moderator effect that did emerge as significant might have actually been underestimated (Mathieu, Aguinis, Culpepper, & Chen, 2012) . There is a complex combination of factors influencing power in models with random slopes and clear guidelines for estimating power in cross-level interaction models are still to be developed (Mathieu & Chen, 2011; Scherbaum & Ferreter, 2009 ). In a simulation study, Mathieu et al. (2012) reported that effect size of the cross-level interaction, level 1 sample size, level 2 sample size, and standard deviation of the slopes are critical factors for influencing power in cross-level interaction models and that these factors interact with each other in determining power.
Conclusion
Our research made a principal contribution by merging transformational-transactional leadership as a behavioural leadership approach with contingency views of leadership by investigating the level at which safety is critical as a contextual characteristic. Results showed that perceptions of the level of accident likelihood in subordinates' work context present a constraint of the effectiveness of TFL and MBEA for team members' safety participation and contextual performance.
